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SUMMARY 
After the death of the Rwandan president April . 6 and the 
ensuing violence in Kigali , the United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) has been on the Security Council's 
(UNSC) agenda daily. On April 15 we sent instructions 
(attachment) to USUN recommending that the Security Council 
withdraw UN forces from Rwanda for their safety. The 
Nigerians, on behalf of the ~AM, circulated a resolution 
calling for a larger UNAMIR force, an expanded mandate 
including protection of Rwandans and government officials, 
promotion of a ceasefire and of a political settlement, and 
facilitation of humanitarian assistance. There is some support 
at the UNSC for revising the mandate, but little for expanding 
the force . There is no support on the Council for a total 
withdrawal of UNAMIR. 
UNAMIR cannot fulfill its mandate under the current 
circumstances and is unlikely to attract personnel or obtain 
equipment for an expanded operation . UNAMIR is currently 
affording some degree of protection to 12,000 refugees in 
Kigali . We should not advocate (and we could not get agreement 
i n the Security Council for) abandoning these people, nor does 
i .t seem feasible for UNAMIR forces to take the refugees with 
them. UNAMIR is, thus, as a practical matter, stuck in Kigali 
until the situation there calms sufficiently for these people 
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to.disperse. Once this happens, however, we should urge an 
or6erly withdrawal of all ·uNAMIR forces while retaining a 
Special Representative to broker a new ceasefire and re-start 
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We should nevertheless be prepared to support the retention 
of a small UNAMIR presence to provide security to the UN's 
Special Representative if the UNAMIR commander and 
Boutros-Ghali can make a credible case that such a presence 
would facilitate efforts to obtain a ceasefire and would not 
face unreasonable risks. 
DISCUSSION 
Following the death of the Rwandan president last week and 
subsequent violence which left an estimated 20,000 dead, the 
Security Council is discussing the role and future of UNAMIR. 
Our instruction cable.to USUN (attachment) was fully cleared by 
key State offices and by JCS, OSD and NSC. It asked our 
mission in New York·to emphasize the following points: 
0 -- In the current environment in Rwanda, there is no role 
for a United Nations peacekeeping force. 
o --Our opposition to retaining a UNAMIR presence .•• is based 
on our conviction that the Security Council has an 
obligation to ensure that peacekeeping ope~ations are 
viable, that they are capable of fulfilling their mandate, 
and that UN peacekeeping personnel are not placed or 
retained, knowingly, in an untenable situation. 
o -- We are willing to support and encourage a political 
initiative by the Secretary General to promote 
reconciliation among the ~arties. 
No Action Taken in Security Council: Taking into account 
the significant UNSC oppositfon to our proposal, we were 
willing to accept a British compromise resolution which would 
have withdrawn UNAMIR forces~ suspended operations, and 
retained a small, interim presence headed by the Special 
Representative and including enough troops to ensure its 
protection. The Nigerians and the NAM would not go along, and 
there has been no decision on the future of UNAMIR. The 
450-man Belgian contingent has, however, pulled out. 
UNAHIR Unable to Deter Violence: Intense fighting 
continues in Rwanda, especially in and around Kigali, where 
most of UNAMIR is located. No decision has meant that the 
force remains and runs the risk of being drawn into an ever 
more dangerous situation. There is little evidence that the 
presence of UNAMIR troops is serving as a deterrent in Kigali; 
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it~dia not deter the outbreak of violence, nor is it 
si~nificantly curbing the violence. We have received reports 
that the stadium where UNAMIR is protecting several thousand 
Rwandans was hit by rocket fire today. 
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To further complicate UNAMIR's withdrawal, 12,000 Rwandans 
have taken refuge with UNAMIR. Although UNAMIR's lightly armed 
forces could not protect them from an army assault, the 
presence of UNAMIR forces has protected them from the sort of 
mob violence that has killed many in the.past week. These 
civilians cannot stay with UNAMIR indefinitely as sanitation 
and food supplies pose problems. Any plan to withdraw UNAMIR 
forces must include finding a way to move these people to 
safety to prevent more massacres or viole~ce against UNAMIR by 
those who feel they are being abandoned. 
Changing the Mandate: · We should continue to resist efforts 
to change and broaden UNAMIR's mandate. There are no signs of 
compromise, and the fighting continues. Given UNAMIR's current 
size and its light armament, the force cannot carry out a 
revised mandate that might include, for example,- protection of 
endangered Rwandans or of government buildings and officials. 
There is little suppor~ either in the Security Counci~ or. in 
the USG for enlarging or upgrading UNAMIR, changes that would 
have to accompany a new mandate. 
With renewed fighting, UNAMIR can no longer perform its 
main function -- monitoring the cease fire and facilitating the 
implementation of the Arusha peace accords. The United'Nations 
continues to have a role to play in Rwanda, but it is one of 
political reconciliation, not peacekeeping. Even if the UNSC 
expanded the mandate and found additional forces capable of 
protecting the Rwanda population, it would be difficult to meet 
a key goal of peacekeeping operations: realistic criteria for 
ending the operation. The on~ appropriate role for the UN is 
to continue to try to broker ~ ceasefire and relaunch the peace 
process. 
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